Windows-MCP
- Type
- MCP server
- Scanned
- Nov 12, 2026
- Version
- 106b50c4e50c
- Files read
- 233
Windows-MCP is an MCP server that lets AI agents control a Windows computer through mouse and keyboard actions, screen captures, file and Registry tools, web scraping, and PowerShell commands. Because it runs with the logged-in user's full permissions and no sandboxing, a tricked AI agent—or a local or network attacker when optional HTTP modes are enabled—can execute arbitrary commands, read sensitive data on screen or disk, and make permanent system changes.
What it can reach
- Shell commands
- Runs arbitrary PowerShell commands and launches any executable or Start Menu app with the current user's permissions.
- Files
- Reads, writes, appends, copies, moves, searches, and deletes files and folders anywhere the user can access, and saves PNG screenshots to disk.
- System
- Controls the mouse and keyboard, captures screenshots and UI trees, reads and sets the Windows clipboard, lists and kills processes, reads and edits the Windows Registry, sends toast notifications, and can register a login Scheduled Task.
- Browser
- Reads text, links, and interactive DOM elements from open Chrome, Edge, and Firefox windows via Windows accessibility APIs.
- Network
- Fetches public HTTP/HTTPS URLs via the Scrape tool, sends usage and error telemetry to PostHog by default, and optionally listens on local or network ports via SSE or Streamable HTTP.
Findings
-
MediumDefault-on telemetry sends GeoIP profiles, tracebacks, and error text containing window titles and URLs
src/windows_mcp/infrastructure/analytics.py:127
Telemetry to
https://us.i.posthog.comis enabled by default and documented in README.md and manifest.json as collecting no personal information, tool arguments, or tool outputs. However, the PostHog client is initialized withdisable_geoip=False,enable_exception_autocapture=True, andprocess_person_profile=True, andtrack_errorsendsstr(error)on every tool exception—which includes target URLs inScrape, executable paths and window names inApp, and the user's active window title or searched text whenWaitFortimes out.Fix: Make telemetry opt-in (
default=False), setdisable_geoip=Trueandenable_exception_autocapture=False, and send only the exception type name (type(error).__name__) instead ofstr(error). -
LowHTTP loopback mode and login task run without authentication by default
src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:833
When started with an HTTP transport on localhost or 127.0.0.1—including via the
windows-mcp installcommand, which registers a Scheduled Task that startsstreamable-httpon 127.0.0.1:8000 at every login—the server skips the authentication check if no auth key is configured. On multi-user Windows machines (such as Remote Desktop or Fast User Switching) or systems running sandboxed local workloads with loopback access (such as WSL), any other local user or process can connect to 127.0.0.1:8000 and silently run PowerShell commands as the logged-in user.Fix: Require or auto-generate a bearer token for loopback HTTP transports and
windows-mcp installunless an explicit opt-out flag is passed. -
Low
windows-mcp authdefaults to binding 0.0.0.0 over unencrypted HTTPsrc/windows_mcp/__main__.py:1135
Running
windows-mcp authwith no flags—as shown in the README—writestransport = "sse"andhost = "0.0.0.0"into~/.windows-mcp/config.tomlwithout TLS. Becausewindows-mcp serveloads this config file whenever CLI flags are omitted, every subsequent bareservelaunch (including existing stdio client configs) opens port 8000 on all network interfaces over plain HTTP, exposing the static Bearer token in cleartext if used across a local network.Fix: Default
--hostinwindows-mcp authto127.0.0.1, preservestdiounless an HTTP transport is explicitly requested, and warn or require--with-tlswhen binding to non-loopback addresses. -
LowTool exclusion filter silently ignores mismatched names and relies on private FastMCP internals
src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:510
_apply_tool_filtermatches tool names case-sensitively and silently skips unrecognized names without warning; notably, SECURITY.md still refers to the shell tool asShellrather thanPowerShell, so--exclude-tools Shellor--exclude-tools powershellleavesPowerShellactive. In addition, the filter mutates private FastMCP attributes (_tool_manager._tools/_local_provider._components) whilepyproject.tomlallows anyfastmcp>=3.0, so an upstream attribute rename would cause both--toolsand--exclude-toolsto fail open with all tools enabled.Fix: Match tool names case-insensitively, raise a startup error when
--toolsor--exclude-toolsnames an unknown tool or resolves zero registered tools, and use FastMCP's public tool removal API.
