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Windows-MCP

CursorTouch/Windows-MCP

B
Type
MCP server
Scanned
Nov 12, 2026
Version
106b50c4e50c
Files read
233

Windows-MCP is an MCP server that lets AI agents control a Windows computer through mouse and keyboard actions, screen captures, file and Registry tools, web scraping, and PowerShell commands. Because it runs with the logged-in user's full permissions and no sandboxing, a tricked AI agent—or a local or network attacker when optional HTTP modes are enabled—can execute arbitrary commands, read sensitive data on screen or disk, and make permanent system changes.

What it can reach

Shell commands
Runs arbitrary PowerShell commands and launches any executable or Start Menu app with the current user's permissions.
Files
Reads, writes, appends, copies, moves, searches, and deletes files and folders anywhere the user can access, and saves PNG screenshots to disk.
System
Controls the mouse and keyboard, captures screenshots and UI trees, reads and sets the Windows clipboard, lists and kills processes, reads and edits the Windows Registry, sends toast notifications, and can register a login Scheduled Task.
Browser
Reads text, links, and interactive DOM elements from open Chrome, Edge, and Firefox windows via Windows accessibility APIs.
Network
Fetches public HTTP/HTTPS URLs via the Scrape tool, sends usage and error telemetry to PostHog by default, and optionally listens on local or network ports via SSE or Streamable HTTP.

Findings

1 medium3 low
  1. MediumDefault-on telemetry sends GeoIP profiles, tracebacks, and error text containing window titles and URLs

    src/windows_mcp/infrastructure/analytics.py:127

    Telemetry to https://us.i.posthog.com is enabled by default and documented in README.md and manifest.json as collecting no personal information, tool arguments, or tool outputs. However, the PostHog client is initialized with disable_geoip=False, enable_exception_autocapture=True, and process_person_profile=True, and track_error sends str(error) on every tool exception—which includes target URLs in Scrape, executable paths and window names in App, and the user's active window title or searched text when WaitFor times out.

    Fix: Make telemetry opt-in (default=False), set disable_geoip=True and enable_exception_autocapture=False, and send only the exception type name (type(error).__name__) instead of str(error).

  2. LowHTTP loopback mode and login task run without authentication by default

    src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:833

    When started with an HTTP transport on localhost or 127.0.0.1—including via the windows-mcp install command, which registers a Scheduled Task that starts streamable-http on 127.0.0.1:8000 at every login—the server skips the authentication check if no auth key is configured. On multi-user Windows machines (such as Remote Desktop or Fast User Switching) or systems running sandboxed local workloads with loopback access (such as WSL), any other local user or process can connect to 127.0.0.1:8000 and silently run PowerShell commands as the logged-in user.

    Fix: Require or auto-generate a bearer token for loopback HTTP transports and windows-mcp install unless an explicit opt-out flag is passed.

  3. Lowwindows-mcp auth defaults to binding 0.0.0.0 over unencrypted HTTP

    src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:1135

    Running windows-mcp auth with no flags—as shown in the README—writes transport = "sse" and host = "0.0.0.0" into ~/.windows-mcp/config.toml without TLS. Because windows-mcp serve loads this config file whenever CLI flags are omitted, every subsequent bare serve launch (including existing stdio client configs) opens port 8000 on all network interfaces over plain HTTP, exposing the static Bearer token in cleartext if used across a local network.

    Fix: Default --host in windows-mcp auth to 127.0.0.1, preserve stdio unless an HTTP transport is explicitly requested, and warn or require --with-tls when binding to non-loopback addresses.

  4. LowTool exclusion filter silently ignores mismatched names and relies on private FastMCP internals

    src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:510

    _apply_tool_filter matches tool names case-sensitively and silently skips unrecognized names without warning; notably, SECURITY.md still refers to the shell tool as Shell rather than PowerShell, so --exclude-tools Shell or --exclude-tools powershell leaves PowerShell active. In addition, the filter mutates private FastMCP attributes (_tool_manager._tools / _local_provider._components) while pyproject.toml allows any fastmcp>=3.0, so an upstream attribute rename would cause both --tools and --exclude-tools to fail open with all tools enabled.

    Fix: Match tool names case-insensitively, raise a startup error when --tools or --exclude-tools names an unknown tool or resolves zero registered tools, and use FastMCP's public tool removal API.