MiniMax-MCP
- Type
- MCP server
- Scanned
- Nov 12, 2026
- Version
- 2904f3333474
- Files read
- 28
MiniMax-MCP is an MCP server that lets AI agents generate speech, clone voices, play audio, and create or edit images and videos through the MiniMax cloud API. Its biggest risk is that a prompt-injected agent can make the server fetch internal or cloud metadata URLs, send data in URL requests to outside servers, or upload sensitive local files to MiniMax.
What it can reach
- Network
- Sends API requests to the configured MINIMAX_API_HOST, downloads generated media URLs, and fetches arbitrary URLs passed to voice_clone or play_audio when is_url is enabled.
- Files
- Reads local files passed to voice_clone, play_audio, generate_video, and image_edit, searches parent directories for similar filenames, and writes generated media files to disk when MINIMAX_API_RESOURCE_MODE is set to local.
- Secrets
- Reads MINIMAX_API_KEY and related MINIMAX_* settings from environment variables or a .env file and sends the API key as a Bearer token to MINIMAX_API_HOST.
- System
- Runs the external ffplay program as a subprocess to play audio aloud on the computer when the undocumented play_audio tool is called.
Findings
-
HighUnvalidated URL fetching enables SSRF and data exfiltration in voice_clone and play_audio
When is_url=True is passed to voice_clone or play_audio (a tool enabled by default even though it is omitted from the README), the server calls requests.get() directly on the supplied URL with no host validation, IP blocklist, response size limit, or timeout. If untrusted text tricks the AI agent via prompt injection, the server can be made to access localhost services, private network hosts, or cloud metadata endpoints (such as 169.254.169.254) and, in voice_clone, upload the internal response directly to MiniMax. It also gives a prompt-injected agent an outbound HTTP channel to send workspace data to an attacker-controlled URL.
Fix: Validate URLs to allow only http/https schemes, resolve hostnames and block loopback, link-local, and private IP ranges (including on redirects), enforce explicit request timeouts and maximum download sizes, or pass remote URLs to the MiniMax API instead of fetching them locally.
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MediumArbitrary local files can be uploaded to MiniMax without file-type or folder checks
The image_edit, voice_clone, and generate_video tools accept local file paths that are meant to be reference images or audio clips, but none of them confine paths to MINIMAX_MCP_BASE_PATH or verify that the file is actually an image or audio file (image_edit explicitly disables the file extension check, and voice_clone and generate_video open paths directly). A prompt-injected agent can pass paths to sensitive files such as ~/.ssh/id_rsa or .env, causing the server to read their raw bytes and upload them to external MiniMax API servers.
Fix: Restrict local input files to an allowed directory (such as MINIMAX_MCP_BASE_PATH after resolving symlinks and '..' segments) and verify both file extensions and magic bytes for supported audio and image formats before reading and uploading.
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MediumMissing input files trigger a full recursive directory walk and leak file paths
When play_audio or image_edit is given a non-existent file path whose parent directory exists (for example, /missing.mp3 or ~/missing.mp3), process_input_file calls find_similar_filenames, which runs os.walk() across the entire parent directory tree and fuzzy-matches every filename. A prompt-injected agent can stall the server with heavy disk and CPU load by walking '/' or the home folder, and receive up to five matching media file paths from private subdirectories in the error message.
Fix: Remove automatic recursive directory scanning on missing files, or restrict any filename suggestions to non-recursive listings strictly inside MINIMAX_MCP_BASE_PATH.
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LowOutput directory and filenames can escape MINIMAX_MCP_BASE_PATH in local mode
When MINIMAX_API_RESOURCE_MODE is set to local, users configure MINIMAX_MCP_BASE_PATH as the base output folder, but build_output_path lets any tool's output_directory argument bypass base_path using an absolute path, '~', or '..' traversal, creating directories and saving media files anywhere writable by the user. In addition, build_output_file inserts unsanitized characters from text or task_id directly into the generated filename.
Fix: Resolve output_path with Path.resolve() and verify that it stays within the resolved MINIMAX_MCP_BASE_PATH directory, and strip path separators and '..' from generated filename components.
