mcpvault
- Type
- MCP server
- Scanned
- Nov 13, 2026
- Version
- 2e9deb96d791
- Files read
- 183
MCPVault is a local MCP server and optional agent skill that lets AI assistants read, search, create, edit, move, and delete notes in an Obsidian vault folder. Its biggest risk is a path-filtering bypass that lets a prompt-injected AI agent read, overwrite, or delete non-note files in the vault (such as JSON configs, keys, or scripts) and move files outside the vault folder through local trash.
What it can reach
- Files
- Reads, searches, creates, edits, moves, and deletes files inside the configured Obsidian vault directory (or the current working directory when no vault path is passed), and can send deleted files to the system trash.
- Shell commands
- If the optional obsidian skill is installed, it instructs the coding agent to run local obsidian CLI commands for desktop app actions and git or gh commands when asked to back up or sync the vault.
Findings
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HighNon-note file restriction bypassed via trailing slash, dot segment, or missing extension
MCPVault documents that note tools only access .md, .markdown, .txt, .base, and .canvas files. However, PathFilter.isFile() returns false whenever a path ends with '/', '/.', or '/..', has no extension (such as Makefile or id_rsa), or has an extension longer than 10 characters or with non-alphanumeric characters (such as payload.applescript), causing PathFilter.isAllowed() to treat the path as a directory and skip the extension check. Meanwhile, FileSystemService.resolvePath() calls path.resolve(), which strips trailing slashes and dot segments before touching disk, and readNote, readNoteLines, getNoteOutline, deleteNote, and moveNote do not re-check isAllowed() on the resolved path. A prompt-injected note can trick the agent into reading sensitive non-note files (for example, calling read_note on 'secrets.json/'), deleting binary files ('report.pdf/'), or writing arbitrary script files by writing a temporary .md file and calling move_note with newPath set to 'payload.js/' (or write_note directly on 'Makefile').
Fix: Normalize and resolve the vault-relative path before calling PathFilter.isAllowed(), and require an allowed note extension on every note read, write, move, and delete target rather than inferring whether a path is a directory from its suffix.
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MediumLocal trash deletion can create directories and move files outside the vault
In PathFilter.canonicalizeForMatch(), stripping trailing dots turns '..' segments into empty strings so PathFilter.isAllowed() permits '..' segments, while FileSystemService.normalizePath() leaves them uncollapsed. In deleteNote() with trashMode set to 'local', resolvePath(path) checks containment relative to vaultPath, but trashPath joins the uncollapsed path onto vaultPath/.trash (one directory deeper) without re-checking containment. Because search_notes and get_notes_info expose the absolute vaultPath in obsidian:/// URIs, a tricked agent on a vault like /Users/alice/Vault can write payload.md and call delete_note with path and confirmPath set to '../../alice/Vault/payload.md' and trashMode 'local', which passes resolvePath() as /Users/alice/Vault/payload.md but moves the file outside the vault to /Users/alice/alice/Vault/payload.md.
Fix: Reject '..' segments in PathFilter, compute the vault-relative path from the resolved fullPath via relative(this.vaultPath, fullPath), and verify that finalTrashPath resolves inside the vault's .trash directory before creating parent folders or renaming.
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MediumIn-vault symlinks bypass .obsidian, .git, and Windows cross-drive checks on read, list, and move
FileSystemService.resolvePath() only checks whether a symlink's resolved target passes pathFilter.isAllowed() when followSymlinks is true, which is enabled only for in-place write locks. Read, listing, move, and delete methods (readNote, readNoteLines, getNoteOutline, listDirectory, moveNote, moveFile, deleteNote) call resolvePath() with followSymlinks set to false. If a shared or git-synced vault contains a symlink to .obsidian or .git (for example, 'notes/ref.md -> ../.obsidian/plugins/obsidian-git/data.json' or 'notes/obs -> ../.obsidian'), an agent can read .obsidian plugin credentials or .git/config even in --read-only mode, or write through a directory symlink with move_note or move_file into .obsidian/plugins/ or .git/hooks/. Additionally, checking relative(this.vaultPath, realPath).startsWith('..') without path.isAbsolute() fails to block symlinks or directory junctions pointing to another drive letter on Windows.
Fix: Always check relative(this.vaultPath, realPath) against pathFilter.isAllowed() (or isAllowedForListing() in listDirectory) regardless of followSymlinks, and reject paths where path.isAbsolute(relativeToVault) is true.
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LowDeveloper deployment script downloads and runs unpinned remote TypeScript without prompting agents
The repository's website deployment script (npm run ship, not included in the published npm package and never run by the MCP server) fetches https://shibumistack.dev/ship/latest.ts at runtime without a cryptographic hash check, writes it to a temporary directory, and executes it with Bun. When isAgentExecution() detects an AI coding agent environment or non-TTY stdio, it skips the interactive confirmation prompt automatically.
Fix: Pin expected SHA-256 digests for downloaded ship client scripts and require explicit user confirmation (--yes) rather than auto-approving when isAgentExecution() is true.
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LowRepository triage skill instructs agents to check out and run tests on unreviewed PR branches
skills/triage/resources/finding-rules.md:49
Alongside the obsidian skill, the skills/ directory contains a maintainer triage skill (discoverable when installing skills from the repository). When invoked, it reads untrusted public GitHub issues and instructs a review sub-agent to check out open contributor PR branches and run 'npm test && npm run build' (with scripts/triage/run.sh enabling Bash tool access), which would execute untrusted code from a stranger's pull request on the local machine.
Fix: Move maintainer-only skills outside the public skills/ install directory or run untrusted PR builds strictly inside isolated CI containers rather than local git worktrees.
