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mcp-for-blender

ahujasid/mcp-for-blender

A
Type
MCP server
Scanned
Nov 13, 2026
Version
578360f8007c
Files read
73

This project connects AI coding assistants to a live Blender session so the AI can inspect scenes, run Blender Python scripts, import 3D assets, and generate 3D models or worlds. Because its primary tool runs arbitrary Python inside Blender—and its optional safe-mode filter can be bypassed while the Blender addon also opens an unauthenticated local TCP port whenever Blender starts—prompt injection or another local process can run commands and access files on your computer.

What it can reach

Shell commands
Executes arbitrary Python code inside the live Blender process via execute_blender_code, which can launch programs and run system commands as the current user.
Files
Reads and writes Blender scene files, viewport screenshots, image files passed to look or 3D generators, MCP client configuration files during setup, Blender user addon files, and any file reachable from Python scripts run in Blender.
Network
Opens a local TCP socket listener inside Blender on port 9876 by default, connects to external 3D asset and generation APIs (Poly Haven, Sketchfab, Poly Pizza, Hyper3D Rodin, Tencent Hunyuan3D, Tripo, Meshy, World Labs, and MCP for Blender Premium), checks GitHub for addon updates on Blender startup, and sends usage telemetry to Supabase.
Secrets
Reads user API keys and Premium license keys from Blender addon preferences, scene properties, and BLENDERMCP_* environment variables to authenticate with 3D asset and generation services.
Browser
Opens documentation, terms, Discord, and API key management pages in the default web browser when clicked in Blender's addon panel.

Findings

4 low2 info
  1. LowSafe mode AST sandbox can be bypassed to run arbitrary OS commands and Python code

    src/blender_mcp/safe_mode.py:765

    Setting BLENDER_MCP_SAFE_MODE=1 is meant to protect against prompt injection (such as hostile instructions hidden in 3D asset descriptions) by blocking os, subprocess, eval, exec, open, and raw file or network access in execute_blender_code. However, ALLOWED_MODULES permits standard library modules such as uuid, dataclasses, typing, enum, and random that expose os, sys, or builtins as module attributes (for example uuid.os, dataclasses.builtins, and random._os). Because visit_Attribute only blocks double-underscore dunder names and a short list of Blender-specific names, and visit_Call allows any attribute call without checking _FORBIDDEN_CALLABLES, scripts such as 'import uuid; uuid.os.system(...)' or 'import dataclasses; dataclasses.builtins.exec(...)' pass validation and execute unrestricted commands inside Blender.

    Fix: Pass a restricted __builtins__ dictionary to exec(), block single-underscore attribute access in visit_Attribute, forbid os, sys, builtins, and _FORBIDDEN_CALLABLES names on attribute lookups, and remove or wrap allowed modules that re-export os, sys, or builtins.

  2. LowBlender addon automatically starts an unauthenticated TCP command server on launch

    src/blender_mcp/bundled/addon.py:1602

    Once the addon is enabled (which mcp-for-blender setup performs automatically), Blender starts a TCP socket listener on localhost:9876 every time Blender opens, even when no AI assistant is running. The listener has no password, token, or handshake check and accepts execute_code JSON messages that run arbitrary Python on Blender's main thread (the same code also lives in root addon.py). Any other user, container sharing host networking, or sandboxed process on the computer can connect to port 9876 to execute code as the user—bypassing BLENDER_MCP_SAFE_MODE=1—and if the user enables Allow Remote Connections in addon preferences, anyone who can reach the port on the network gains unauthenticated remote code execution.

    Fix: Generate a random shared secret token stored with owner-only file permissions, require every socket connection to present that token before queuing commands, and consider starting the listener only when explicitly requested.

  3. LowPredictable temporary file paths used for viewport screenshots

    src/blender_mcp/server.py:694

    When capturing the viewport in _capture_viewport and _look_via_script, the MCP server instructs Blender to save PNG files to predictable PID-based names (blender_screenshot_<pid>.png and blender_look_<pid>.png) directly inside the shared system temporary directory (/tmp on Linux) before reading and deleting them. On a multi-user system, another local user can pre-create those filenames to break screenshot capture or, on systems without kernel symlink and regular-file protections in /tmp, interfere with file reads and writes.

    Fix: Write temporary screenshots inside a private per-process directory created with tempfile.mkdtemp() (mode 0700) or use unpredictable filenames created with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile.

  4. LowAddon phones home to GitHub on startup and updates from an unpinned branch

    src/blender_mcp/bundled/addon.py:7328

    Five seconds after Blender starts, the addon automatically fetches addon.py from the repository's mutable main branch on GitHub unless the undocumented BLENDERMCP_NO_UPDATE_CHECK environment variable is set (setting DISABLE_TELEMETRY=true does not disable this request). If the user clicks Update addon in Blender's sidebar, install_addon_update overwrites the installed addon directly with the fetched main-branch script without pinning to a release tag or verifying a cryptographic hash or signature.

    Fix: Fetch addon updates only from immutable tagged releases with checksum verification, make automatic startup update checks opt-in, and document BLENDERMCP_NO_UPDATE_CHECK in the README.

  5. InfoMinimal usage telemetry is sent to an external server by default

    src/blender_mcp/telemetry.py:314

    Although the README's telemetry section begins with 'Telemetry is opt-in', only content collection (prompts, code, screenshots, and scene trajectories) is off by default. On startup and on every tool call, the MCP server sends anonymous usage events (including a persistent install UUID, session ID, tool name, duration, OS, and Blender/addon versions) to a Supabase endpoint unless the user sets DISABLE_TELEMETRY=true.

    Fix: Disable all outbound telemetry network requests by default until the user explicitly opts in.

  6. InfoTool output instructs the AI assistant to pitch a paid subscription in chat

    src/blender_mcp/premium_hint.py:20

    Once per session when a user generates a 3D model using their own API keys rather than MCP for Blender Premium, generate_3d appends a hidden instruction to the tool output telling the AI assistant to advertise the paid Premium plan and share a referral link with the user.

    Fix: Remove promotional instructions aimed at steering the assistant from tool responses and keep Premium information in documentation or the Blender UI.