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Leonxlnx/taste-skill/skills

D
Type
Skill
Scanned
Nov 13, 2026
Version
f6b76575f949
Files read
522

This skill helps AI coding assistants design, build, and test websites using bundled layouts, visual effects, and automated browser checks. Its biggest risk is that using it in an untrusted project folder can automatically run malicious code hidden in that folder or let its local test servers expose private files elsewhere on your computer.

What it can reach

Files
Reads and edits website files in the project folder, saves generated assets, screenshots, and .taste-skill tracking files, uses system temporary folders for caches and browser profiles, and can follow relative links into parent folders.
Network
Starts temporary local web servers on 127.0.0.1 for browser checks, connects to local dev servers, and downloads fonts, icons, photos, and street map data from Google Fonts, jsDelivr, Wikimedia Commons, Unsplash, Picsum, and OpenStreetMap.
Shell commands
Automatically runs a shell command after each AI turn to launch its Node.js quality check script, runs local Node.js build and test scripts, and optionally runs ffmpeg to convert images or taskkill on Windows to close browsers.
Browser
Opens headless Chrome, Edge, or Chromium in the background to render local web pages and 3D graphics, run page scripts, check layouts and forms, and capture screenshots.

Findings

4 high4 medium5 low
  1. HighStop hook searches workspace paths before user home, allowing untrusted repos to run code

    skills/taste-skill/SKILL.md:18

    When this skill is installed in a user's home folder (~/.claude/skills or ~/.agents/skills), hook environments commonly set CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR and HOME without setting CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR or CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT. Because the Stop hook checks $CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR/.claude/skills/design-taste-frontend/scripts/gate.mjs and $CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR/.agents/skills/design-taste-frontend/scripts/gate.mjs before $HOME, using the skill to review or restyle an untrusted repository that includes a malicious .agents/skills/design-taste-frontend/scripts/gate.mjs file will automatically execute that file with Node when the agent finishes its turn.

    Fix: Remove $CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR paths from the hook search list, or only resolve gate.mjs from trusted skill or user-home installation directories.

  2. HighBrowser checker climbs parent folders based on ../ in HTML, exposing user files to page scripts

    skills/taste-skill/scripts/consistency.mjs:4578

    When checking a local HTML file without --root, consistency.mjs counts ../ sequences in the HTML and walks its local HTTP server root up that many parent directories, and it also serves symlinks without checking their real target path. If a user checks an untrusted landing page (or prompt injection adds ../ and a script to a page), a simple href="../../" can make the local server expose the user's entire home directory on the same HTTP origin as the page in headless Chrome, letting inline JavaScript fetch private keys or .env files and send them to an external server.

    Fix: Do not climb above the project directory based on ../ references in HTML, and resolve requested paths with fs.realpathSync to block symlinks that point outside the served root.

  3. HighStop gate trusts .taste-skill/build.json and waivers.json from untrusted folders

    skills/taste-skill/scripts/gate.mjs:730

    When gate.mjs runs in Stop-hook mode, it searches the current directory and up to two subdirectories down for any recently touched .taste-skill/build.json (such as one in a freshly cloned or unpacked repo) and automatically runs headless Chrome checks on it. Unlike --profile, marker.root and marker.page in build.json are resolved with path.resolve without checking that they stay inside the project, so a repo with root set to "../../.." exposes parent directories same-origin to its index.html in Chrome; marker.url can also force Chrome to visit arbitrary localhost URLs, and text in waivers.json is echoed straight into the Stop hook's blocking prompt to the agent.

    Fix: Track active builds using a session token stored in a trusted user-owned temp or config folder rather than trusting .taste-skill/build.json on disk alone, and enforce inProject() containment on marker.root and marker.page.

  4. HighLocal HTTP server climbs unbounded ../ references and follows symlinks, exposing host files to page scripts

    skills/taste-skill/scripts/shoot.mjs:95

    When shoot.mjs (and skills/taste-skill/assets/layout/check.mjs, which contains the same code) serves a local HTML file without --root, it counts ../ sequences in the file's src, href, import, and url() references and walks the HTTP server's root directory up that many parent folders without stopping at the project root. It also checks f.startsWith(root + path.sep) without resolving symlinks via fs.realpathSync. If the user runs the skill to review or restyle an untrusted HTML file containing ../../../ references (or a repo with symlinks), the HTTP server exposes ancestor folders such as $HOME on the same 127.0.0.1 origin opened in headless Chrome, allowing JavaScript in the page to fetch private files like ~/.ssh/id_rsa or ~/.aws/credentials and exfiltrate them over the internet or render them into screenshots.

    Fix: Never let the served root directory climb above process.cwd() (and the trusted skill assets directory if needed), and resolve paths with fs.realpathSync before verifying they stay inside the allowed root in both scripts/shoot.mjs and assets/layout/check.mjs.

  5. MediumPartial path traversal and symlink following in local static servers

    skills/taste-skill/scripts/perf.mjs:96

    The local HTTP server in perf.mjs (and the matching static servers in effects.mjs and moments.mjs) checks !file.startsWith(root) without requiring a trailing path separator and does not check fs.realpathSync. When headless Chrome loads an untrusted page, scripts on the page can request URL-encoded /..%2f paths to read files in sibling folders whose names start with the same prefix as root, or request symlinks inside the project folder that point to sensitive files elsewhere on disk.

    Fix: Resolve both root and the target file with fs.realpathSync, and check that file === root || file.startsWith(root + path.sep) before serving.

  6. MediumIncomplete regex SVG sanitization before innerHTML allows script execution from untrusted icon SVGs

    skills/taste-skill/assets/diagrams/diagram.js:216

    diagram.js fetches SVG files (including client-supplied logo paths or URLs and icon files) and injects their markup via span.innerHTML = t after attempting to strip <script> tags and double-quoted on* attributes with regular expressions. This blacklist is bypassed by single-quoted or unquoted event handlers (such as onload='...'), slash-separated attributes (<svg/onload="...">), <foreignObject>, or SVG animation events (<animate onbegin='...'>). A crafted SVG logo supplied in client assets will execute JavaScript inside headless Chrome during layout/screenshot checks and in visitors' browsers on the built site.

    Fix: Render external or client-supplied SVGs with <img> instead of innerHTML, or parse SVGs with DOMParser and rebuild them using a strict allowlist of geometry elements and presentation attributes.

  7. MediumScene screenshot script opens arbitrary URLs and Chrome profiles with unsafe SwiftShader

    skills/taste-skill/assets/scenes/_demo/shoot.mjs:253

    Unlike gate.mjs and the rules stated in SKILL.md (which forbid file:// URLs, non-local hosts, and Chrome profiles outside the project or temp folder), shoot.mjs passes the --page option directly to Chrome's Page.navigate without validating its scheme or host, accepts any --profile path, and launches Chrome with --enable-unsafe-swiftshader. If prompt injection in a brief or page tricks the agent into running shoot.mjs with crafted --page or --profile arguments, it can capture screenshots of local file:// paths or internal network services into the build output, point Chrome at an existing user profile, or expose Chromium's deprecated SwiftShader JIT to untrusted remote WebGL shaders.

    Fix: Restrict --page to http://127.0.0.1 or localhost URLs, enforce that --profile stays inside os.tmpdir() or the project's .taste-skill directory without '..' traversal, and do not enable --enable-unsafe-swiftshader for non-local pages.

  8. MediumMaintainer HTML tools with DOM-based XSS are copied into public web assets

    skills/taste-skill/assets/objects/_print-core/make-fallbacks.html:56

    Step 0 of SKILL.md instructs the agent to copy the entire <skill>/assets directory into assets/ or public/assets/ of the user's static site or existing React, Next.js, Vue, Svelte, or Astro application. That directory includes maintainer HTML pages that unsafely insert URL-controlled values into innerHTML. In make-fallbacks.html, the ids query parameter is interpolated into a.innerHTML; passing a path segment that normalizes back to a valid object (such as ?ids=<img src=x onerror=...>/../print-cup) resolves ../print-cup/object.js, renders the object, and executes arbitrary JavaScript on the site's origin. A similar innerHTML sink exists in skills/taste-skill/assets/objects/product-render/make-posters.html via the spec query parameter (which accepts a data: or CORS-enabled JSON URL whose id or poster field is injected into a.innerHTML). When copied into public/assets/, this exposes local dev servers and deployed web applications to same-origin cross-site scripting.

    Fix: Build the download link DOM nodes using createElement('img') and textContent instead of innerHTML in both make-fallbacks.html and make-posters.html, validate id/spec parameters against a strict allowlist, and exclude maintainer, demo, and lab HTML files when copying assets into a project's public folder.

  9. LowLocal HTTP check servers lack Host header validation and per-run authentication

    skills/taste-skill/assets/layout/check.mjs:68

    assets/layout/check.mjs (ports 5770-5779, up to 4 minutes), scripts/shoot.mjs (ports 5300-5399, up to 8 minutes), and the developer script assets/backgrounds/check.mjs (port 5967, up to 25 minutes, which also uses !file.startsWith(SKILL) without a trailing path separator) bind HTTP servers to 127.0.0.1 on predictable ports without validating the Host header or requiring a random per-run URL secret. While a screenshot or check is running, a malicious website open in the user's browser could use DNS rebinding against those ports to read served files.

    Fix: Reject requests whose Host header is not 127.0.0.1:<port>, require a random per-run URL token path prefix, and check file.startsWith(SKILL + path.sep) in assets/backgrounds/check.mjs.

  10. LowPredictable temporary Chrome profile directory allows local DevTools hijack and file write

    skills/taste-skill/assets/objects/product-render/make-posters.mjs:98

    When make-posters.mjs runs without --profile and TASTE_SKILL_TMP is unset, it creates a predictable folder in the shared system temp directory (/tmp/taste-skill-posters-<pid>) with fs.mkdirSync(..., { recursive: true }) and ignores errors when deleting DevToolsActivePort. On a multi-user machine, another local user can read DevToolsActivePort to control the headless Chrome instance, or pre-create that directory with a spoofed DevToolsActivePort so make-posters.mjs connects to the attacker's local WebSocket server and writes attacker-chosen files via window.__files.

    Fix: Use fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'taste-skill-posters-')) so the temporary profile directory has an unpredictable name and 0700 permissions, and fail if an existing DevToolsActivePort file cannot be removed.

  11. LowPath traversal when writing poster images and manifest from a product spec

    skills/taste-skill/assets/objects/product-render/make-posters.mjs:152

    make-posters.mjs builds output file paths using path.join(dir, ...) with unvalidated names derived from spec.poster, spec.id, and window.__files keys, and creates parent folders with fs.mkdirSync(..., { recursive: true }). If run on an untrusted product spec JSON whose poster or id field contains '../' segments, it will write .stills.json, .png, and .webp files outside the spec's directory.

    Fix: Reject spec.poster, spec.id, and window.__files keys containing '..' or path escapes, and verify that path.resolve(dir, target) begins with dir + path.sep before creating directories or writing files.

  12. LowPartial path prefix check and uncaught URL decode error in local poster server

    skills/taste-skill/assets/objects/product-render/make-posters.mjs:77

    The temporary HTTP server on 127.0.0.1 checks !p.startsWith(root) without a trailing path separator, allowing requests to read sibling directories whose names start with 'objects' (such as assets/objects-draft). In addition, decodeURIComponent is called without error handling, so a malformed URL request like /%FF from any local process or visited webpage throws an uncaught URIError that crashes make-posters.mjs and leaves its headless Chrome child process running.

    Fix: Wrap decodeURIComponent in a try/catch that returns 400 on malformed URLs, check !(p === root || p.startsWith(root + path.sep)), and ensure child Chrome processes are cleaned up on uncaught errors.

  13. LowSibling-prefix path traversal and unhandled URIError in scene HTTP server

    skills/taste-skill/assets/scenes/_demo/shoot.mjs:176

    The local HTTP server in shoot.mjs checks file.startsWith(root) where root has no trailing path separator. A request with an encoded slash such as /..%2ftaste-skill-other/file.js bypasses URL pathname normalization, decodes via decodeURIComponent, and resolves to a sibling directory whose name shares the root prefix, allowing files in matching sibling directories to be served on 127.0.0.1 while shoot.mjs runs; malformed percent-encoding also throws an uncaught URIError that crashes the server.

    Fix: Wrap decodeURIComponent in a try/catch that returns HTTP 400, resolve paths with path.resolve, and check that file === root || file.startsWith(root + path.sep).