jadx-ai-mcp
- Type
- Repo
- Scanned
- Nov 12, 2026
- Version
- 9f4fce6f4990
- Files read
- 48
JADX-AI-MCP is a JADX-GUI plugin that runs an embedded HTTP server so a companion MCP server and AI coding agent can inspect decompiled Android APKs, read live debugger state, rename symbols, and manage comments. Its biggest risk is that the plugin automatically starts an unauthenticated HTTP server on all network interfaces (0.0.0.0:8650) while reporting 127.0.0.1, letting anyone on the local network or a malicious webpage read decompiled app code and debugger variables or alter the open JADX project.
What it can reach
- Network
- Starts an embedded HTTP server inside JADX-GUI (port 8650 by default, bound to all network interfaces) to answer requests from the companion MCP server.
- Files
- Reads decompiled source code, Smali, manifest, strings, and resources of the APK open in JADX-GUI, modifies symbol names and comments in the open JADX project, and stores the configured port in Java user preferences.
- System
- Reads live threads, stack frames, registers, and object variables from an Android process when the JADX debugger is attached and paused.
Findings
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HighPlugin HTTP server binds to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0) without authentication
src/main/java/com/zin/jadxaimcp/server/PluginServer.java:47
When JADX-GUI opens, the plugin automatically starts its Javalin HTTP server via .start(port) without passing a loopback host address, causing Jetty to bind to 0.0.0.0 (every network interface on port 8650 by default) with no password or token check. Although the startup log, status dialog, and architecture docs state 127.0.0.1, anyone on the same Wi-Fi, LAN, or VPN can connect directly to port 8650 to read all decompiled APK source code, resources, comments, and live debugger variables, or rename symbols and edit comments in the user's open project. The plugin UI also provides no option to stop the server or restrict its bind address.
Fix: Bind Javalin to loopback by default using .start('127.0.0.1', port), require a bearer token on all requests, and add a menu toggle to stop the server or explicitly opt into remote binding.
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MediumState-changing HTTP GET routes and missing Host/Origin checks allow browser-based attacks
src/main/java/com/zin/jadxaimcp/server/PluginServer.java:205
All refactoring and comment routes (/rename-class, /rename-method, /rename-field, /rename-package, /rename-variable, and /add-comment) are registered as unauthenticated HTTP GET endpoints, and the server checks neither Origin nor Host headers. Even if the server is only reachable locally, any malicious website the user visits while JADX-GUI is running can trigger cross-origin GET requests (for example via image tags or no-cors fetches) to silently rename classes and packages, overwrite or delete project comments, or launch expensive full-APK searches, and can use DNS rebinding to read decompiled code and debugger data.
Fix: Change all mutating endpoints from GET to POST, validate that the Host header matches localhost, reject cross-origin Origin or Sec-Fetch-Site headers, and require a custom authentication header.
