skills
- Type
- Plugin
- Scanned
- Nov 13, 2026
- Version
- 27000402070d
- Files read
- 159
This plugin gives AI coding agents skills to generate images, videos, audio, brand kits, thumbnails, and full-stack Cloudflare Worker websites and games through the Higgsfield AI CLI and local helper scripts. Its biggest risks are automatic execution of an unpinned remote CLI install script, pulling unpinned UI source code and dependencies from third-party community domains during website builds, and deploying websites straight to public URLs with overly broad framing permissions.
What it can reach
- Shell commands
- All nine skills enable Bash execution to run the higgsfield CLI, bundled Python and shell scripts, git, bun, npx, ffmpeg, ImageMagick, LibreOffice, and Blender.
- Files
- Reads local images, videos, audio, and documents supplied to workflows, and writes generated media, project directories, state files under ~/.higgsfield-skills, and skill symlinks under ~/.claude, ~/.cursor, or ~/.agents.
- Network
- Communicates with Higgsfield AI APIs and CDNs to upload media, run generation jobs, clone website git repos, and deploy sites to *.higgsfield.app, while also fetching installers from GitHub, fonts and templates from Google, and optional components or assets from third-party hosts.
- Secrets
- Uses Higgsfield CLI credentials stored in ~/.config/higgsfield/credentials.json, scoped git tokens and Worker secrets for deployed websites, and an optional MESHY_API_KEY environment variable.
- Browser
- Uses the system browser for interactive OAuth login via higgsfield auth login and runs headless Playwright Chromium to screenshot local HTML review boards.
- System
- Setup and skill bootstrap commands install the higgsfield CLI binary (which may prompt for sudo to write to /usr/local/bin), and optional workflows install Python packages or portable Blender builds.
Findings
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MediumUnpinned remote CLI installer piped to shell at bootstrap
higgsfield-generate/SKILL.md:37
Six skills (higgsfield-generate, higgsfield-product-photoshoot, higgsfield-soul-id, higgsfield-marketplace-cards, higgsfield-websites, and higgsfield-youtube-thumbnail) as well as the ./setup script instruct the agent or shell to download and execute install.sh directly from the mutable main branch on GitHub via curl | sh. There is no version tag, commit hash, or SHA-256 checksum verification, and unlike higgsfield-brandkit, those six skills run the installer automatically before any other command without asking user permission.
Fix: Pin the CLI installer to an immutable release version, verify a cryptographic SHA-256 checksum before execution, and require explicit user confirmation in every skill before installing binaries.
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MediumUnpinned code and dependencies fetched from third-party component domains
higgsfield-websites/references/wow-maker.md:232
The website builder instructs the agent to install UI blocks using npx shadcn@latest add from nine external community domains (magicui.design, cult-ui.com, smoothui.dev, chanhdai.com, motion-primitives.com, kokonutui.com, tailark.com, eldoraui.site, and animata.design). Each command downloads unpinned remote JSON containing TypeScript source files and npm dependency lists directly into the local project and installs them, meaning a compromise or domain takeover on any of those indie hosts can execute code locally and inside the deployed site.
Fix: Vendor vetted UI components inside the skill repository or restrict component installation to pinned package versions with integrity hashes rather than pulling live source files from external community URLs.
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MediumPermissive frame-ancestors policy exposes deployed apps to cross-tenant clickjacking
higgsfield-websites/references/security.md:466
Every user-created website, app, and game is deployed on a subdomain of higgsfield.app. However, the mandatory applySecurityHeaders() helper forbids X-Frame-Options and sets CSP frame-ancestors to allow https://*.higgsfield.app as well as two hardcoded developer Workers (*.anwar-695.workers.dev), instructing the agent never to narrow or remove that list. As a result, any stranger who deploys a site on *.higgsfield.app can embed another user's deployed app inside an iframe to perform clickjacking attacks against signed-in visitors.
Fix: Restrict frame-ancestors to 'self' and the exact Higgsfield editor origin (such as https://higgsfield.ai), removing the wildcard https://*.higgsfield.app tenant domain and the developer workers.dev hosts.
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LowWebsites deploy immediately to the public internet while presented as previews
higgsfield-websites/SKILL.md:221
Although README.md mentions deploy preview/production, SKILL.md states there is no preview stage and that every higgsfield website deploy publishes the site immediately to a live, publicly reachable <subdomain>.higgsfield.app URL (with robots.txt allowing all crawlers). At the same time, the skill instructs the agent to deploy automatically at the end of a build, omit mention of git pushes or deployments, and describe the live URL to the user as a preview, risking unintended public exposure of draft or internal content.
Fix: Require explicit user confirmation before pushing code and running higgsfield website deploy, and accurately inform the user that the deployed URL is live on the public internet rather than a private preview.
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LowBrandbook builder skips SVG validation before rasterizing untrusted assets
higgsfield-brandkit/scripts/build_brandbook.py:494
While brandkit.py defines validate_svg() to reject XML doctypes/entities, scripts, and external file or network references, build_brandbook.py never calls validate_svg() in convert_png() when rasterizing logos or mockups. In addition, if <svg appears after the first 1,024 bytes, the payload is written as input.img and passed directly to ImageMagick without restricting input coders, exposing the user's machine to XML entity expansion or ImageMagick coder issues when building a Brandbook from client-supplied files.
Fix: Call validate_svg() on any SVG input inside build_brandbook.py and pass explicit safe format prefixes (such as png: or jpg:) to ImageMagick instead of an untyped .img filename.
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LowRegex SVG sanitizer allows HTML and script injection in local review boards
higgsfield-brandkit/scripts/brandkit.py:646
When rendering Essential Kit review boards, logo_markup() embeds the body of a supplied SVG directly into local HTML files that are opened via file:// in Playwright Chromium and linked for the user. Because validate_svg() uses regular expressions that require whitespace before event handlers and do not block HTML tags such as <img>, crafted markup like <rect/onload=...> or <img/src=x/onerror=...> bypasses the check; font_css() also injects font names via json.dumps() into <style> without escaping </style>.
Fix: Embed SVGs via an isolated <img src="data:image/svg+xml;base64,..."> element instead of inlining raw SVG markup into HTML, and escape </ sequences inside <style> blocks.
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LowGame texture guide instructs installing Python packages with --break-system-packages
higgsfield-websites/references/game-textures.md:36
When numpy or pillow is absent, the game-textures workflow instructs running pip install with --break-system-packages without creating a virtual environment or asking the user first, bypassing PEP 668 OS package-manager protections.
Fix: Use an isolated Python virtual environment (python3 -m venv) and ask user permission before installing Python dependencies rather than passing --break-system-packages.
