← MCP server and skill grades

skills

gencraft-labs/skills

B
Type
Skill
Scanned
Nov 13, 2026
Version
5d625f59c710
Files read
35

This collection of agent skills lets AI coding assistants generate and edit images, videos, music, and Codex desktop pets on RunComfy using the local runcomfy command-line tool. The biggest risk is that nineteen skills pre-approve runcomfy execution without user confirmation, allowing a prompt-injected agent to spend RunComfy credits or leak workspace data via external media URLs fetched by RunComfy's servers, while the codex-pet skill uses unescaped shell templates that can expand commands or secrets.

What it can reach

Shell commands
Runs the runcomfy CLI (pre-approved without confirmation in nineteen skills via allowed-tools) and, in codex-pet, runs shell commands including ImageMagick (magick), mkdir, cp, and cat.
Network
Sends prompts and reference media URLs to model-api.runcomfy.net (whose backend fetches any external HTTPS media URLs provided) and downloads generated files from *.runcomfy.net and *.runcomfy.com.
Files
Writes downloaded images, audio, and video into --output-dir (or the current directory), can read local JSON or YAML request files via --input-file, and writes custom pet files into ~/.codex/pets/.
Secrets
Uses the RunComfy API token stored in ~/.config/runcomfy/token.json or the RUNCOMFY_TOKEN environment variable to authenticate and bill requests.
Browser
Opens a browser window during runcomfy login for device-code authentication.

Findings

2 medium2 low
  1. MediumPre-approved runcomfy execution enables unprompted data exfiltration and API billing via prompt injection

    runcomfy-cli/SKILL.md:4

    Nineteen skills in this repository declare allowed-tools: Bash(runcomfy *) in their frontmatter, which lets the coding agent run any runcomfy command without asking the user for confirmation once a skill is triggered. Although the Security & Privacy sections state there are no callbacks to third parties, many documented model endpoints accept external image, audio, or video URLs in --input that RunComfy's backend server fetches over HTTP. If the agent is tricked by prompt injection in untrusted text (such as a webpage, issue, or README), it can silently invoke runcomfy run with --no-wait to encode sensitive workspace or conversation data into query parameters on an attacker-controlled media URL, run up charges on the user's RunComfy account (up to $10-$21+ per video call), or write outputs to arbitrary writable paths via --output-dir.

    Fix: Remove allowed-tools: Bash(runcomfy *) from the skill frontmatter (or limit pre-approval to read-only commands such as Bash(runcomfy whoami) and Bash(runcomfy status *)) so the user confirms paid model runs, output paths, and external media URLs.

  2. MediumUnescaped shell templates and heredoc in codex-pet allow command and variable expansion

    codex-pet/SKILL.md:229

    Unlike the other skills that pass single-quoted JSON or use jq, the codex-pet pipeline assigns PET_NAME, PET_DESC, and SOURCE_URL in double quotes, constructs --input inside double quotes, writes pet.json with an unquoted <<EOF heredoc, and places PET_NAME directly into ~/.codex/pets/${PET_NAME} without path validation—while claiming under Security & Privacy that there is no shell-injection surface. If an agent fills these placeholders from untrusted text (such as a webpage, issue, or batch asset metadata), Bash expands $(...) backticks and $VAR expressions (allowing command execution or leaking $RUNCOMFY_TOKEN into pet.json or the fetched SOURCE_URL), unescaped quotes corrupt pet.json, and ../ in PET_NAME can write files outside the pets directory.

    Fix: Pass user values with single quotes or environment variables serialized via jq -n --arg, use a quoted heredoc (<<'EOF') when writing static templates, and validate that PET_NAME matches a simple slug such as ^[a-z0-9_-]+$ with no path separators.

  3. LowInstall instructions reference multiple former GitHub organizations and repositories

    README.md:8

    Although this repository is hosted at gencraft-labs/skills, README.md and individual SKILL.md files instruct users to run npx skills add against three different repository paths: agentspace-so/runcomfy-agent-skills, agentspace-so/runcomfy-skills, and genmedia-labs/skills. When GitHub organizations or repositories are renamed and old names are left unclaimed, a stranger can register the abandoned organization or repository on GitHub (repojacking) and serve malicious skills to anyone running the documented install commands.

    Fix: Update all npx skills add commands and cross-skill links to point consistently to gencraft-labs/skills (and keep defensive placeholder accounts registered for any retired GitHub organization names).

  4. LowUnpinned CLI package installation and npx -y execution

    runcomfy-cli/SKILL.md:45

    The setup instructions across the skills tell operators (and agents triggered on 'install runcomfy') to run npm i -g @runcomfy/cli or npx -y @runcomfy/cli without pinning a version. Passing -y to npx automatically downloads and executes whatever version is currently tagged latest on npm without prompting, increasing exposure if the upstream npm package were ever compromised.

    Fix: Pin a vetted version of @runcomfy/cli in install and npx examples (for example @runcomfy/cli@x.y.z) and omit -y so users confirm package installation.