mcp
- Type
- MCP server
- Scanned
- Nov 13, 2026
- Version
- a51ddc4ee221
- Files read
- 144
Browser MCP is an MCP server and companion Chromium extension that lets AI coding agents drive tabs inside your own signed-in Chrome browser. Because it acts in your logged-in web sessions and can read or overwrite any file on your computer, a malicious webpage that tricks the agent or serves a crafted download can steal sensitive data, act on your accounts, or plant executable files on your machine.
What it can reach
- Browser
- Opens, navigates, clicks, fills forms, runs page JavaScript, takes screenshots, and inspects network requests (including cookies and authorization headers) on non-browser tabs in your signed-in Chrome profiles once paired.
- Files
- Reads any local file path on your computer for page uploads, writes or overwrites any local file path for downloads, PDFs, and screenshots, and stores daemon tokens, pairing keys, and logs in ~/.browsermcp.
- Network
- Runs a local HTTP and WebSocket relay server on 127.0.0.1 (ports 9010 to 9012 by default) and can visit or fetch from any web or localhost URL reachable by your browser.
- System
- Starts a detached background Node.js daemon process on your computer that stays running for up to 10 minutes after the last AI app disconnects.
Findings
-
HighDownloads without a target path save server-chosen filenames directly into the project root
packages/mcp/src/commands/save.ts:300
When the download command runs without --path, it takes the filename and extension from the remote server's Content-Disposition header, the link's download attribute, or the final URL and writes the file directly into the AI app's first MCP root (typically your open code repository) or working directory. Although path separators, leading dots, and existing files are avoided, any 1 to 8 character extension is preserved regardless of Content-Type, so simply asking the agent to download an ordinary document from an untrusted site lets the server drop a file named eslint.config.js, postcss.config.js, conftest.py, sitecustomize.py, or Directory.Build.targets into the workspace root where editors, linters, test runners, or build tools execute it automatically.
Fix: Save downloads that omit --path into an isolated directory (such as ~/Downloads or a dedicated .browsermcp-downloads subfolder) rather than the workspace root, and enforce safe extensions matching the response Content-Type.
-
MediumBrowser file commands can read and overwrite any file on the computer outside MCP roots
packages/mcp/src/thin/files.ts:56
Although the MCP server exposes a single browser tool described as controlling Chrome and queries the client's MCP roots, createFileAccess accepts absolute paths, ~ paths, parent-directory traversal (..), and symlinks anywhere on the host filesystem, and overwrites existing files when --path is used. If an untrusted webpage prompt-injects the agent, it can tell the agent to run upload to exfiltrate local secrets (such as ~/.ssh keys or cloud credentials) to an external site, or run download with --path to overwrite shell startup files or Git hooks (such as ~/.zshrc or ~/.ssh/authorized_keys) with attacker-controlled bytes. This grants full-disk read and write power even in MCP clients like Claude Desktop that have no shell or filesystem tools enabled, and is only warned about in packages/mcp/README.md rather than the main README or tool description.
Fix: Confine resolved real paths in readFile and writeFile to the client's declared MCP roots or a dedicated downloads folder by default, and refuse to overwrite existing files unless explicitly enabled.
-
MediumUnauthenticated /extension WebSocket allows local processes to spoof a paired browser
packages/mcp/src/relay/server.ts:142
The local relay daemon protects /client, /cdp, and /shutdown with a secret token stored in ~/.browsermcp/daemon.json (mode 0600), yet accepts WebSocket connections on /extension whenever the HTTP Origin header matches an allowed chrome-extension:// ID. While browsers stop websites from forging Origin, any non-browser process on the same computer (such as another OS user on a shared workstation or a sandboxed local process or container sharing loopback) can send that Origin header, report pairing as paired, and set a high lastFocusedAt timestamp. Because pairing only authenticates the daemon to the extension and up to eight browsers can connect at once, the rogue local client silently becomes the default browser even while your real Chrome is connected, letting it capture URLs, typed credentials, and uploaded files from the agent and return crafted page snapshots to prompt-inject the AI app.
Fix: Make pairing mutual by generating a persistent key pair per extension profile, binding both public keys into the 6-digit pairing code, and requiring user approval on the MCP/daemon side before accepting a new extension key.
