anti-detect-browser-skills
antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skills
- Type
- Plugin
- Scanned
- Nov 13, 2026
- Version
- b800e3a54d8d
- Files read
- 11
This Claude Code plugin provides four Markdown skills that teach AI coding agents how to automate web browsing and multi-account scraping with the AntiBrow SDK and MCP server. Installing the plugin runs no code by itself, but following its instructions downloads and runs a closed-source Chromium binary that handles your live logins and can expose broad browser and screen-streaming tools to the agent.
What it can reach
- Files
- Installing the plugin adds Markdown skill files, while the AntiBrow SDK and CLI it instructs the agent to run read and write browser profiles, cookies, captured passkeys, cached scraping recipes, and the browser binary under ~/.anti-detect-browser/ and ~/.antibrow/.
- Network
- Connects to antibrow.com and its CDN to download the browser kernel, verify licenses daily, optionally sync profiles, and stream Live View sessions, as well as connecting to GitHub for recipes and any websites or proxies opened in the browser.
- Shell commands
- Instructs the AI coding agent to run npm, pip, npx, python, docker, and anti-detect-browser CLI commands to install packages, manage profiles, run isolation checks, and execute scraping recipes.
- Secrets
- Reads ANTIBROW_API_KEY or ANTI_DETECT_BROWSER_KEY and proxy credentials from environment variables or ~/.antibrow/license.key, and stores website cookies, session tokens, and captured passkeys inside local profile directories.
- Browser
- Launches and controls persistent fingerprinted Chromium sessions via Playwright, CDP, or MCP tools capable of navigating pages, clicking, filling forms, running arbitrary in-page JavaScript, taking screenshots, and streaming live browser screens.
Findings
-
MediumClosed-source browser binary is downloaded at runtime without pinned build hashes
anti-detect-browser/SKILL.md:366
Following the skills installs an MIT-licensed wrapper SDK that downloads and executes a 190 to 320 MB closed-source Chromium binary from AntiBrow's CDN on first launch and phones home daily for license checks. Although the skill claims both artifacts are pinnable and verifiable, new profiles default to resolving the newest kernel build from a remote manifest by major version number rather than an immutable hash pinned inside the SDK, meaning a compromised vendor CDN or manifest could deliver untrusted native code even when the npm or PyPI package version is pinned.
Fix: Run the closed-source browser inside an isolated VM or container, pre-warm a vetted kernel directory, and verify downloaded kernel binaries against immutable cryptographic hashes before execution.
-
MediumDomain allowlist cannot stop third-party scraping recipes from modifying or leaking data on the same site
multi-account-scraping/SKILL.md:132
The scraping skill pulls community JavaScript recipes from
antibrow/recipesand encourages running reviewed recipes inside logged-in profiles, stating that recipes only read data and are safe becausemeta.domainsblocks requests to undeclared hosts. However, because recipe code executes directly inside the authenticated page context with fullfetchand DOM access, host-level filtering cannot block state-changingPOSTorDELETEactions on that site or stop a compromised recipe from exfiltrating private account data by posting or messaging it to another account on the same allowed domain.Fix: Run third-party recipes only in throwaway
--temporaryprofiles unless you have personally audited the exact recipe source code and verified it performs no writes on the allowed domain. -
LowRecommended MCP configuration exposes live screen-streaming and profile tools by default
The
.mcp.jsonsetup snippet launchesanti-detect-browser --mcpwith all server tools enabled, includingstart_live_view(which streams the browser screen to a shareable URL),list_profiles,evaluate, andclaim_proxy. Although the skill prose warns users to manually restrict tools in their MCP client, an unfiltered setup lets a prompt-injected agent open an existing logged-in profile, start a Live View screen stream, and leak the shareable stream URL or session data by navigating to an attacker-controlled page.Fix: Configure an explicit MCP client tool allowlist limited to basic browsing tools (
launch_browser,navigate,get_content,screenshot,close_browser) and keep untrusted browsing in temporary profiles. -
LowUnpinned npx and package installation commands in skill instructions
multi-account-isolation/SKILL.md:85
Several skill files instruct the agent or CI pipeline to download and run unpinned packages from public registries, including
npx liarjsfor unattended CI checks inmulti-account-isolation/SKILL.md,npm install -g anti-detect-browserandpip install antibrowinmulti-account-scraping/SKILL.md, andpip install antibrowinanti-detect-browser/SKILL.md. Because AI agents load individualSKILL.mdfiles on demand without necessarily readingREADME.md, following these commands resolves and executes whateverlatestpackage version is currently published.Fix: Pin exact package versions and verify package integrity hashes for all
npm,npx, andpipcommands inside everySKILL.mdfile. -
LowPasskey credentials are captured into portable, syncable storage by default
anti-detect-browser/SKILL.md:372
In the launch options taught by the skill,
webauthn_capturedefaults toTrue, storing newly created WebAuthn passkeys in a portable profile store rather than an OS- or hardware-bound enclave so they travel with profile exports or cloud sync. Unlike session cookies, captured passkeys remain persistent cryptographic authenticators even after logging out, and the credential-audit documentation inmulti-account-isolation/SKILL.mdomits passkeys when listing sensitive artifacts stored on disk or synced to the cloud.Fix: Pass
webauthn_capture=Falsewhen launching profiles for real accounts unless portable passkey storage is explicitly required, and avoid enablingsync=Trueon profiles holding sensitive passkeys.
