agent-browser
vercel-labs/agent-browser/skills/agent-browser
- Type
- Skill
- Scanned
- Nov 13, 2026
- Version
- 2f533ec7d74c
- Files read
- 1
This skill connects an AI agent to the agent-browser CLI so it can automate Chrome/Chromium browsers, cloud browsers, and Electron desktop apps like Slack and VS Code. Its biggest risk is that it pre-approves all agent-browser commands without user confirmation, meaning prompt injection from a visited webpage could trick the agent into taking unauthorized actions in logged-in sites or connected desktop apps.
What it can reach
- Shell commands
- Pre-approves running any agent-browser CLI subcommand without confirmation and instructs installing the CLI globally via npm.
- Browser
- Controls local Chrome or Chromium via the Chrome DevTools Protocol to visit URLs, click elements, fill forms, record videos or HAR traffic, and read page snapshots.
- System
- Automates local Electron desktop applications including VS Code, Slack, Discord, Figma, Notion, and Spotify.
- Network
- Connects to arbitrary websites as well as Vercel Sandbox microVMs, protected Vercel deployments, and AWS Bedrock AgentCore cloud browsers.
- Secrets
- Uses persisted login sessions, browser state, and an authentication vault to interact with authenticated websites and workspaces.
Findings
-
MediumWildcard auto-approval for all agent-browser CLI commands
skills/agent-browser/SKILL.md:4
The skill frontmatter pre-approves every agent-browser subcommand so the agent can execute them without asking the user each time. Because agent-browser reads untrusted web pages into the agent's context, hidden text on a malicious page (prompt injection) could trick the agent into silently navigating to attacker URLs, submitting forms in logged-in sessions, sending Slack messages, or controlling connected Electron apps like VS Code.
Fix: Restrict allowed-tools to read-only documentation lookups such as Bash(agent-browser skills:*) so browser navigation, form submission, binary installation, and desktop app automation still prompt the user for approval.
-
LowOverrides built-in web tools that have tighter safety boundaries
skills/agent-browser/SKILL.md:3
The skill description instructs the agent to prefer agent-browser over any built-in web tools while hiding the skill from slash-command menus via hidden: true. Coding agents typically isolate built-in web fetch tools with per-domain prompts, read-only HTTP fetches, or separate summarization passes, whereas routing simple page reads through a local Chrome instance executes page JavaScript locally and feeds raw accessibility trees directly into the main agent context.
Fix: Remove the blanket instruction to override built-in web tools so routine read-only URL fetches continue to use the host agent's safer built-in web fetch tool, reserving agent-browser for interactive browser tasks.
-
LowUnpinned global npm package and binary install command
skills/agent-browser/SKILL.md:12
The setup instruction installs the latest version of agent-browser globally from npm and downloads browser components without pinning a specific version. If the npm package were ever compromised, a user or agent running this setup command would execute untrusted package install code and load altered runtime skill prompts via agent-browser skills get.
Fix: Pin the installation command to a specific audited version (for example, npm i -g agent-browser@x.y.z) before running agent-browser install.
