CVE-2026-79750
MCPHub
- Severity
- High
- Published
- August 31, 2026
- Last modified
- September 8, 2026
MCPHub is a unified hub for centrally managing and dynamically orchestrating multiple MCP servers/APIs into separate endpoints with flexible routing strategies. Prior to version 1.0.30, MCPHub scopes non-admin users to servers they own (list views and config edits enforce ownership), but the tool-execution API does not. Any authenticated non-admin user can invoke tools on MCP servers owned by other users — servers they cannot even see in GET /api/servers. Because connected MCP servers carry real capability (filesystem, HTTP fetch, cloud APIs with the owner's keys), this is cross-tenant compromise: demonstrated arbitrary host file read (/etc/passwd, another user's secrets) and SSRF. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.30.
CVSS vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
- CWE-639 Authorization bypass through a user-controlled key
References
Listed in
More MCPHub CVEs
MCPHub's SSRF guard in src/utils/ssrf.ts uses a custom isBlockedIpv6 function that only checks for loopback, link-local, unique-local, IPv4-mapped, and IPv4-compatible IPv6 addresses.
The POST /api/servers and PUT /api/servers/:name endpoints in MCPHub create/update MCP server configurations and then immediately spawn the configured stdio process via child_process.spawn.
An authenticated non-admin user can register a server pointing at an arbitrary URL and make the hub issue server-side requests to it, with no egress filtering (no block of loopback / RFC1918 / link-local…
When a bearer key with accessType: 'servers' (or 'custom') is used against a group route, isBearerKeyAllowedForRequest grants access to the entire group as long as any single server in that group appears in…
The built-in prompt and resource controllers perform no role checking.
MCPHub's PUT /api/system-config endpoint (handler updateSystemConfig) performs no authorization check.