CVE-2026-58485
mcp-searxng
- Severity
- High
- Published
- September 15, 2026
- Last modified
- September 30, 2026
mcp-searxng is a Model Context Protocol server that gives AI assistants web search and URL-reading capabilities through SearXNG. Prior to 1.7.1, web_url_read receives its caller-controlled URL through src/index.ts and validates only the literal hostname in assertUrlAllowed() within src/url-reader.ts before undiciFetch() performs operating-system DNS resolution. A public-looking attacker-controlled hostname that resolves to a private, loopback, link-local, or cloud-metadata address therefore passes the lexical check and causes the MCP server to connect to the internal destination. In the default HTTP configuration, an unauthenticated network client can use this path to read internal services, expose credentials or service tokens, and enumerate reachable internal hosts; in STDIO deployments, prompt-influenced tool selection can provide the malicious URL. Direct private IP literals are blocked, and MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS remains an explicit opt-out. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.1.
CVSS vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
- CWE-918 Server-side request forgery
References
Listed in
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The web_url_read URL policy in src/url-reader.ts can be bypassed while MCP_HTTP_HARDEN is enabled and MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS is not enabled because redirect targets are not revalidated, 0.0.0.0 is not…
Web_url_read passes a caller-supplied URL to the server-side fetch path while assertUrlAllowed() in src/url-reader.ts runs only when MCP_HTTP_HARDEN is enabled, even though MCP_HTTP_HARDEN is disabled by…