CVE-2026-44694
n8n-MCP
- Severity
- Critical
- Published
- May 8, 2026
- Last modified
- June 17, 2026
n8n-MCP is an MCP server that provides AI assistants access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. From version 2.18.7 to before version 2.50.2, there is an authenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability affecting the webhook trigger tools, the n8n API client (N8N_API_URL), and per-request URLs supplied via the x-n8n-url header in multi-tenant HTTP mode. This issue has been patched in version 2.50.2.
CVSS vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L
Weakness
References
- github.comPatch
- github.comRelease Notes
- github.comVendor Advisory
Listed in
More n8n-MCP CVEs
Multi-tenant HTTP mode with ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true could allow an authenticated tenant to access default-scope workflow_versions backups instead of being confined to the tenant scope, exposing or deleting…
In HTTP mode with multi-tenancy enabled through ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true, n8n-mcp's local workflow version history backups were not isolated per tenant, allowing an authenticated tenant to read workflow…
When ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true, the HTTP transport documents that the target n8n instance is selected per-request from x-n8n-url / x-n8n-key headers.
The workflow telemetry sanitizer could retain partial fragments of URL-shaped node parameters before sending workflow data to the project's anonymous telemetry backend.
When n8n-mcp runs in HTTP transport mode, authenticated MCP tools/call requests had their full arguments and JSON-RPC params written to server logs by the request dispatcher and several sibling code paths…
When n8n-mcp runs in HTTP transport mode, incoming requests to the POST /mcp endpoint had their request metadata written to server logs regardless of the authentication outcome.