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CVE-2026-105697

Langflow

9.9
Severity
Critical
Published
October 5, 2026
Last modified
October 9, 2026

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Before Langflow 1.10.3, the MCP stdio transport launched whatever command / args a user put in an MCP server configuration, with no allowlist and (before 1.10.3) wrapped in bash -c "exec {command} ...". Any user able to reach the MCP server settings ("Settings → MCP Servers → Add MCP Server", POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name}) or to build a flow with the MCP Tools component could add a "server" whose command is an arbitrary OS command (touch, rm -rf, a reverse shell, ...). The command runs on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user as soon as Langflow tries to connect to the server (listing servers, loading tools, running the flow) — even when the UI then reports that the stdio server failed to start. With the default LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true, GET /api/v1/auto_login hands out a token without credentials, so on an exposed instance running the default configuration this is reachable without an account. AUTO_LOGIN is documented as a development-only setting; with it disabled, any authenticated (non-admin) user can exploit it. This issue is fixed in Langflow 1.10.3, langflow-base 0.10.3, and lfx 1.10.3.

CVSS vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Weakness

References

CVE-2026-105697 on NVD

Listed in

CriticalMCP serversCommand injection

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